SCCTOp - Strategic Concept for Combat Team Operations

1. Introduction

The purpose of this document is to act as a policy briefing for KSF, to act as a basis for discussion and development of desirable goals, strategy, organisation and scope of operations for the NYCCT (New York Camarilla Combat Team). It should be considered eyes only.

Based on further discussion, changes in the assumptions underlying this concept may lead to changes in the strategic, organisational and operational concept, until deemed suitable by KSF for dissemination to a wider audience of decision-makers.

2. Executive Summary

3. Goals

The ideological, physical and social struggle between the New York Camarilla and the opposing faction imposes a number of dangers and constraints on behaviour. These include:

1. An ideological challenge: The claim of the Camarilla to speak for all Kindred is undermined by the presence of an opposing ideological faction that is able to present itself as an alternative, permitting defection and infiltration with relative ease, and demoralising current and potential loyalists in the battlespace.
2. A physical challenge: entering areas of the battlespace not under friendly control carries with it the risk of combat, making these unsafe and essentially avoided. Infiltration and border tension renders even spaces nominally under the control of the friendly Faction more dangerous than they otherwise would be.
3. As a consequence of this sense of danger, the development of a 'bunker' or 'trench' mentality that fosters a passive and reactive mindset amongst potential assets in the struggle. Fear of retaliation and an aversion to potential losses demobilises individuals from the struggle, creates an 'every man for himself' mentality of digging in and cedes the strategic initiative to the opposing side.
4. A further corollary to the physical danger is the inherent limitation imposed upon the development of resources. (Herd; retainers; Kindred-owned commercial and government assets) that may be developed in the battlespace. The contested nature of political and law enforcement assets in particular has negative external effects for the maintenance of the Masquerade.

Uncontested control over the battlespace (as defined under section 4) of New York would yield the following material advantages for our faction:

1. Reduced competition for local resources such as Persons of Interest, Herd, Finances and Organised (Kine) violence such as criminal and law enforcement groups;
2. Increased physical security for organisational efforts; (Havens, Elysium) and a reduction in the detrimental secondary effects of such insecurity;
3. An ideological victory over the opposing faction. The symbolic importance of New York can not be understated.
4. A secondary effect may be increased immigration from more secure areas based on increased access to resources, security and a sense of momentum, thus starting a virtuous cycle of increased Camarilla presence.

4. Strategy

The struggle between the Sabbat and ourselves takes place in an ideological, physical and social space. Whilst the global context of this struggle is beyond the scope of this document, a local victory necessitates the elimination of hostile organisation (in the ideological, physical and social sense) from the battlespace.

The inherent value of resources lies in control (ideological, social, physical) of resources in urban areas. For the purposes of organisation, an Area of Control must be conceived of as any contiguous urban area. Rural or suburban areas are poorly situated as sources for organisation due to limitations in housing, places of congregation and resources. Thus, such suburban and rural areas must be considered a barrier that must be traversed, permitting a strategic (time, organisation, 'home defence') advantage to faction in ideological, social and physical control of the territory.

A review of the typology of the terrain suggests that the battlespace should be defined as bounded in the south by the New York Bay and the Reach, with points of control along the Verrazona Narrows- and Bayonne bridges. In the west, it should be defined by control over Newark and its airport and the urban areas due east of the Hackensack River. In the north, it is bounded by Yonkers, Mt. Vernon and New Rochelle. In the east it is bounded by control over John F. Kennedy Airport.

Experience with insurgencies and guerrilla warfare throughout history suggests that the carrying out of the strategic capture of the defined battlespace will take at least 10-15 years, with no defining battles that will mark the end of this period. Only a gradual assertion of control in concentric circles (mediated by the terrain) can be expected.

5. Operational Structure

Strategic

Decision-making power must lie with a designated person or group of persons with the commitment and authority to make and carry out political decisions that will affect the wider community in the pursuit of an adopted long-term strategy. The purpose of this person or group of persons will be the determination of targets for the NYCCT and maintenance of the overall political-ideological situation in the battlespace, with an eye to maintaining the strategic initiative.

Pursuit of the suggested strategy does have inherent risks, such as a higher level of violence and the possibility of (asymmetrical) retaliation. Friendly assets must be psychologically prepared for - and politically supportive of such a strategy if it is to stand any chance of success. (Lest a Gorbachev-style of retreat and conciliation is adopted as losses for which the friendly faction are not prepared are incurred.) This political/psychological level of preparation must be supported and carried out by the higher and political level of the operation.

Operational

The leader of the NYCCT operates on the operational and command level: determining the best way to achieve goals set at the strategic level within the defined constraints, making sure that the appropriate material and personnel is available for any given operation and overseeing training efforts that are undertaken regularly as part of promoting unit cohesion and in anticipation of each particular operation. Whenever tactically appropriate, to take personal command when such operations are executed.

Extensive tactical preparation must be the norm, and these must be enforced by establishing rigid operational practices and protocols that are known to- and carried out by all NYCCT personnel, in accordance with best practices known to the community.

While this approach may prompt some initial resistance, it is important to realise that the unpredictability that results in the surprise of the opposing forces must not lie in the tactical unpredictability resulting from the individual preferences and predilections of friendly assets, but in the strategic surprise established at the strategic level. Indeed, an individualistic approach at the tactical level is just as likely to confuse and surprise other friendly assets as it is the enemy.

Tactical

6. Tactics

The tactics that may be employed by the NYCCT are necessarily bounded by the availability of resources and equipment, the capability of its human assets and the need for secrecy, in particular with regards to the use of organised violence in an urban area.

Whilst kine military tactics are of limited utility, the operations of the Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati or State Intelligence Agency of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan against the decentralised cells of U.S.-sponsored mujaheddin terrorists is instructive in this regard, seeing how it portrays a contemporary effort in quelling an actively hostile, decentralised, ideologically opposing force, rather than the suppression of a docile population as is the case with most intelligence operations.

Tactics that may be adopted in the New York that have been successfully employed by the KhAD may include:

1. Infiltration of enemy cells for the purpose of gathering information
2. Infiltration of enemy cells for the purpose of acting as agents provocateur;
3. Search and capture operations against assets who may be interrogated for information or removed in an effort to suppress particular enemy operations;
4. Organising allied forces in enemy terrain and directing them into a struggle against (proxies of-) the opposing force.
5. Igniting internal rivalries and political divisions amongst enemy cells, rendering suppressing their ability to project force externally on account of infighting.
6. Bribing cells of the opposing force into assuming a neutral or allied stance by means of resources or concessions, even conceding that such relationships may be fickle and temporary without resolving the underlying ideological differences.

Within this context the focus must be on Deep Operations aimed at gaining control over the battlespace, suppressing and disorganising enemy forces throughout the depth of the battlefield. The focus must not be on subduing hostile strong points, but on rendering these irrelevant for their control over the ideological, physical and social space.

Conclusion