SCCTOp - Strategic Concept for Combat Team Operations

1. Introduction

The purpose of this document is to act as a policy briefing for KSF, to act as a basis for discussion and development of desirable goals, strategy, organisation and scope of operations for the NYCCT (New York Camarilla Combat Team). It should be considered eyes only.

Based on further discussion, changes in the assumptions underlying this concept may lead to changes in the strategic, organisational and operational concept, until deemed suitable by KSF for presentation to a wider audience.

2. Executive Summary

Executive Summary: This section is often one to two paragraphs long; it includes an overview of the problem and the proposed policy action.

3. Goals

Control over the battlespace (as defined under section 4) of New York would yield the following material advantages for our faction:

1. Reduced competition for local resources such as Persons of Interest, Herd, Finances and Organised (Kine) violence such as criminal and law enforcement groups;
2. Increased physical security for organisational efforts; (Havens, Elysium)
3. An ideological victory over the opposing faction. The symbolic importance of New York can not be understated.
4. A secondary effect may be increased immigration from more secure areas based on increased access to resources, security and a sense of momentum, thus starting a virtuous cycle of increased Camarilla presence.

Pursuit of such goals does have inherent risks, such as:

-

Strategy

The struggle between the Sabbat and ourselves takes place in an ideological, physical and social space. Whilst the global context of this struggle is beyond the scope of this document, a local victory necessitates the elimination of hostile organisation (in the ideological, physical and social sense) from the battlespace.

The inherent value of resources lies in control (ideological, social, physical) of resources in urban areas. For the purposes of organisation, an Area of Control must be conceived of as any contiguous urban area. Rural or suburban areas are poorly situated as sources for organisation due to limitations in housing, places of congregation and resources. Thus, such suburban and rural areas must be considered a barrier that must be traversed, permitting a strategic (time, organisation, 'home defence') advantage to faction in ideological, social and physical control of the territory.

A review of the typology of the terrain suggests that the battlespace should be defined as bounded in the south by the New York Bay and the Reach, with points of control along the Verrazona Narrows- and Bayonne bridges. In the west, it should be defined by control over Newark and its airport and the urban areas due east of the Hackensack River. In the north, it is bounded by Yonkers, Mt. Vernon and New Rochelle. In the east it is bounded by control over John F. Kennedy Airport.

Tactics

The tactics that may be employed by the NYCCT are necessarily bounded by the availability of resources and equipment, the capability of its human assets and the need for secrecy, in particular with regards to the use of organised violence in an urban area.

Whilst kine military tactics are of limited utility, the operations of the Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati or State Intelligence Agency of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan against the decentralised cells of U.S.-sponsored mujahideen terrorists is instructive in this regard, seeing how it portrays a contemporary effort in quelling an actively hostile, decentralised, ideologically opposing force, rather than the suppression of a docile population as is the case with most intelligence operations.

Tactics that may be adopted in the New York that have been succesfully employed by the KhAD may include:

1. Infiltration of enemy cells for the purpose of gathering information
2. Infiltration of enemy cells for the purpose of acting as agents provocateur;
3. Search and capture operations against assets who may be interrogated for information or removed in an effort to suppress enemy operations;
4. Organising allied forces in enemy terrain and directing them into a struggle against (proxies of-) the opposing force.
5. Igniting internal rivalries and political divisions amongst enemy cells, rendering suppressing their ability to project force externally on account of infighting.
6. Bribing cells of the opposing force into assuming a neutral or allied stance by means of resources or concessions, even conceding that such relationships may be fickle and temporary without resolving the underlying ideological differences.

Within this context the focus must be on Deep Operations aimed at gaining control over the battlespace, suppressing and disorganising enemy forces throughout the depth of the battlefield. The focus must not be on subduing hostile strong points, but on rendering these irrelevant for their control over the ideological, physical and social space.

Operational Structure

Strategic initiative must lie with a designated person separate from the operational and tactical decisions made by the NYCCT.

Focus must be on extensive tactical preparation and rigid operational practices but maintaining the strategic initiative to strike in a time and space of our choosing.

Conclusion